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hich is more likely to encourage creativity
and innovation: a centralized or a
decentralized system of support? Should
large organizations and recognized experts
determine which parties get funding for their ideas? Or
should small businesses, patrons, and foundations
provide the primary support for innovation? Leonard
Nakamura looks at the case for both sides using
economic analysis, empirical studies, and anecdotal
evidence. He also describes the role rivalry plays in
innovation.
1 Centralization refers to the existence of a
single decision maker ￿ a government
agency, a monopoly firm, or a cartel ￿ in a
given industry, specialty, or product line that
determines which innovative efforts to
support.
Michael Tomasello, co-director
of the Max Planck Institute for Evolu-
tionary Anthropology, has argued that
what separates humans from chimpan-
zees and other nonhuman primates is
their ability to maintain and build upon
innovations ￿ teaching children and
peers the best ways to act and think. It
can be argued that the cumulation of
knowledge is not just the most important
source of economic growth but also the
most important factor in the flowering of
human civilization and the dominance
of our species on the planet.
Given the importance of
knowledge, how should we organize its
advance? Should innovation be
centralized, with recognized experts
determining which parties get funding
to develop their ideas?1  Or should
innovation be decentralized, with small
groups and individuals ￿ small
businesses, patrons, incubators, and
foundations ￿ supporting a lot of
innovation?  And to what extent can we
rely on the market system to facilitate
developing and disseminating new ideas
and cultural products?
Of course, scientific, intellec-
tual, and cultural genius does not appear
simply because institutions are favorable.
Innovation can occur when existing
institutions are neglectful of it and even
when they actively oppose it. But
creativity is more likely to flourish and
have its fruits more widely disseminated
when it is recognized and supported.
After all, artists, scientists, and scholars
need offices, laboratories, and studios;
they need time for their creative
activities; and if their products are to
matter, they need to find audiences ￿
art dealers, students, talent scouts,
journal editors, and the buying public.
The market system is often
viewed as nearly synonymous with
decentralization. But modern capitalism
rewards innovation with monopoly
rights.  Copyrights and patents that
protect intellectual and cultural property
give innovators exclusive right to
reproduce cultural, scientific, design,
and engineering innovations. Thus,
innovators gain property rights that may
enable them to monopolize their
markets and thereby possibly to control
future access to innovation and
distribution. Capitalism, by distributing
resources to those successful at innova-
tion, may encourage or discourage
decentralization. This is currently an
important policy issue, one aspect of
which has been raised by the antitrust
suit against Microsoft. Our question, in
this context, becomes: Does market
power, such as Microsoft’s market power
in software, encourage or discourage
innovation? Parallel issues may arise, for
example, in media mergers or in
government research policy.
Similarly, government support
for research need not imply centraliza-
tion. Rather, research may also find22   Q1  2003 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
Public Involvement May
Facilitate Innovation. For these and
other reasons, economists and others
have often argued that governments
and public entities are better supporters
of innovation and creativity. Indeed, in
the United States, the National Science
Foundation, the National Institutes of
Health, the National Endowments for
the Arts and the Humanities, and the
military research and development
(R&D) paid for by the Department of
Defense all bear testimony to the belief
that the federal government is a natural
source of such funding.  In his 1960s
exercise in social forecasting, Daniel Bell
predicted the increasing socialization of
knowledge production. Bell argued that
knowledge (including innovations and
creative products) is what economists
now call a nonrival good because its
transfer to and use by others does not
reduce its benefit to original holders,
unlike with material objects.3
The government can over-
come the monopoly problem of prices
being too high because it can pay for the
fixed cost of innovation with taxes, then
support from large and small profit-
making firms and nonprofit organiza-
tions such as foundations and universi-
ties. So government research agencies
may well be important players within an




In recent decades, economic
analysis has made important strides in
understanding the advance of knowl-
edge. An earlier strand of economic
studies focused on the potential
advantages of centralized innovation.
Barriers to Entry Support
Innovation. Harvard professor Joseph
Schumpeter was the seminal economic
thinker on innovation and its role in the
economy. He argued that developing
and marketing new products was the
key to economic development and that
innovative firms needed to be repaid for
this expensive process.
But if competitors are able to
enter the markets for these new
products and undercut the innovator,
the price of the product will be bid down
to its cost of production, and there will
be no compensating profit for the
innovating firm. To pay for development
of new products, innovating corporations
need to exclude imitative competitors
for some period, to reap temporary
supranormal profits.  Corporations in
some cases may be able to obtain
monopoly power over their innovative
products with intellectual property
rights, such as patents and copyrights,
trademarks, and brand names.  Often,
these will not be enough to adequately
protect the innovation. The innovator
may have to resort to alternative
methods to protect its profits. For
example, a firm may field a large sales
force that specializes in selling the new
product; building such a sales organiza-
tion would be time consuming and
costly for a potential entrant.
Going a step further,
Schumpeter also argued that a large
incumbent monopolist may have a
strong incentive to innovate because a
monopolist typically will have a large
existing customer base to which it can
quickly and easily market new products.
Thus, a monopolist with a strong position
in the marketplace can turn a profit on a
new product far more quickly than a
newcomer to the market would ￿
raising the expected return to innovative
activity. To be sure, Schumpeter was no
apologist for perpetual monopoly.  He
believed that as long as entry was not
impeded by regulation, all such
monopolies were temporary, as entrepre-
neurs struggled amid a ￿gale of creative
destruction.￿ 2
However, there are drawbacks
to innovation through a succession of
temporary private monopolies. First, the
monopolist uses its market power to sell
its product at a high price. Therefore,
some customers who would like to use
the product ￿ and who could afford to
pay its marginal cost of production, but
not the monopoly price ￿  may not be
able to buy it.  Second, a monopolist will
be reluctant to introduce innovations
that compete directly with their existing
products. Therefore, the monopolist’s
incentive to innovate in a given industry
is generally lower than an outsider’s.
Finally, the monopolist incumbent may
use its powerful position within the
industry to reduce potential entrants’
ability to introduce new products
profitably.
2 For a further discussion of Schumpeter’s
theory, see my Business Review article.
3 Economists distinguish between public goods
and nonrival goods. When an individual or
group produces a public good, they can’t
exclude others from enjoying its benefits.  For
example, national defense is a public good. A
nonrival good may be kept from others, but
there is no direct additional cost to providing
it to others. For example, an idea for a new
innovation that is kept secret is not a public
good, but it is a nonrival good. If the idea
cannot be kept secret, it is a public good.
Since over time knowledge tends to become
public, whether it is considered public or
nonrival depends on the time period
considered.  Thus, some economists regard
knowledge as a public good.
A good example of the potential for a
public solution to the problem of innovation
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distribute the innovation at marginal
cost. A good example of the potential for
a public solution to the problem of
innovation is vaccines. When a vaccine
is distributed widely enough, it may be
possible to eliminate all hosts for a
disease and thereby eradicate the
disease itself, as appears to have
occurred with smallpox. In two articles
published in 2001, Michael Kremer
argued that governments ought to pay
inventors of vaccines the social value of
the vaccine, then make the vaccine
available at the lowest possible price.4
Moreover, government support
of research may be valuable because
although the research may have no
immediate practical applications, it may
provide the basis for more profitable
research in the future. For example,
many important mathematical insights
have flowed from theorems that
establish that two different and
seemingly unrelated branches of
mathematics share a common structure:
Andrew Weil’s recent proof of Fermat’s
Last Theorem is an example. Proofs of
this kind often have no direct potential
for profit, and indeed mathematical
propositions are generally not patentable.
(However, see Robert Hunt’s article for
changes in tests of patentability.)
Government support of basic research
has long been accepted in the United
States and has been an important source
of the country’s competitive advantage
due to spillovers. Although basic
research may not have direct applica-
tions, the expertise of those involved in it
may be a valuable resource for more
directly profitable enterprises.
Another implication of Bell’s
argument is that societies with strong
business-government collaboration
(Japan, Singapore) may also be good at
creating and using knowledge.  Indeed,
the success of the East Asian model of
economic development from 1960 to
1990 can be viewed as an illustration of
this concept.
Centralization can prevent
wasteful duplication of research: Private
parties racing to produce the same
innovation are likely to duplicate one
another’s efforts unnecessarily. More-
over, since research is highly risky, it is
valuable for researchers to hedge the
risk that their project will fail.  That is, if
several different researchers are working
on separate lines of research or different
attacks on the same problem, it is
possible that only one will succeed.
Since it is often impossible to predict
which line of research is most promising,
the successful outcome of one approach
need not imply that only one of the
researchers was of value and working
hard. By centralizing and pooling
support and funding, all may receive at
least some reward. Indeed, the modern
corporation with its research laboratories
can be viewed as an institution for
pooling risk in this way. Central and
secure funding for innovators also may
encourage scientists and artists to be
more cooperative about sharing
discoveries and techniques, further
reducing risk and duplication of effort.
Arguments in favor of
government support for research are
reinforced when the research projects in
question are very expensive.  Examples
include space travel, particle colliders,
the mapping of the human genome
project, and nuclear fusion electrical
generation. Moreover, coordination
among private parties who might profit
from the research may be difficult
because sharing intellectual property
rights can result in excessive competi-
tion. And when research is very
expensive, even private-sector monopo-
lists may find the project too risky to
undertake.
Anecdotal Evidence for
Centralized Innovation. Told as
anecdotes about the accomplishments of
big government and monopoly firms as
innovators, much of the evidence from
World War II and the two decades
following appeared to favor
Schumpeter’s and Bell’s arguments.
Researchers at Bell Labs, the
research arm of AT&T and the regional
Bell companies before their breakup,
produced many inventions crucial to the
modern age.  Most famous among them
was the transistor, the key breakthrough
that brought Nobel prizes to three Bell
Labs scientists and ushered in the
electronic age. During that same period,
Bell Labs developed much of the
information science that underpins ever-
increasing bandwidth, including
information theory and coding theory.
IBM, the giant corporation that
dominated the computer industry from
the mid-1950s to the mid-1980s,
developed many inventions crucial to
the computer and electronics, including
the development of the first major
programming language, Fortran.5  One
of IBM’s great breakthroughs was the
360 computer series. Prior to the
invention of the 360 series, computer
operating systems were usually tailor-
made for the particular computer model
they ran on.  Consequently, when
companies wanted to upgrade their
4 In general, Kremer, in a 1998 article,
proposed using an auction to disclose the
private expected value of the patent. Private
parties would bid for the right to patent.
Some of the time, the private parties would be
allowed to win the patent, so the private
parties would have a strong incentive to bid
accurately. The winning auction bid should
be a reasonable estimate of the value of the
patent to a private monopolist. Most of the
time, the government would step in and pay
the inventor a premium over the auction price,
and the premium plus the auction price
reflects the average social value of the patent,
a value that Kremer conservatively estimates
is twice the private value. The social value
includes both what the monopolist would earn
and the consumer surplus (benefits to con-
sumers above and beyond the price they pay). 5 See the book by Emerson Pugh.24   Q1  2003 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
computer systems, they would have to
rewrite or adapt all their existing
computer programs.  The 360 operating
system, by contrast, blended the
computers in the 360 family so that
computer programs written on smaller
ones could run almost seamlessly on
larger ones.
Government R&D has also
had spectacular successes, including the
Manhattan Project, which developed
the first atomic bomb; the development
of ENIAC, the first general-purpose
programmable computer; and NASA,
whose Apollo program successfully put
astronauts on the moon within a
decade.
Centralization Also Has
Drawbacks.  But central authorities ￿
government and business monopolies ￿
can fail to recognize the right path to
innovation. If centralization requires
consensus, it may be harder to make
progress when the consensus is flawed.
Encouraging iconoclastic innovation
may require subjective judgments from
science bureaucrats. But these well-
intentioned government bureaucrats
may be reluctant to break the mold for
fear that they will be accused of
arbitrary or self-serving behavior that
would conflict with government
accountability regulations.
As a consequence, the activity
of nongovernmental supporters of
research ￿ whether they be for-profit
corporations, nonprofit foundations, or
universities ￿ can be crucial to the
speed of innovation.  During the past
three decades, a period of exceptionally
rapid innovation, the government’s share
of R&D has declined. When we
consider basic and applied research and
product development, the federally
funded share has fallen from 64 percent
in the 1960s to 26 percent in 2000, while
industry-funded research has risen to 68
percent (Table 1).
Private, rivalrous industries,
such as pharmaceuticals, finance, and
semiconductors, just to name a few
obvious ones, have been at the heart of
much of modern innovation. This has
increased interest in understanding how
companies actively competing with one
another might be good at conducting
R&D. Moreover, more systematic views
of the evidence have long suggested
that the anecdotes about Bell Labs and




 It may be that the top experts
in a given field are not the best judges of
innovation. One way of ensuring that
many different talents and ideas have
the opportunity to find an audience is to
have many venues through which the
people with talent and ideas can obtain
funding and publicity. Decentralization
thus may be a superior way to develop
new products when it is hard to discern
the best talents and ideas.
Free Entry Is Best When
￿Nobody Knows.￿ In his path-breaking
book on the organization of creative
industries, Richard Caves argues that in
innovative and creative markets, no one
can know in advance who will succeed,
a condition he calls ￿nobody knows.￿
Decentralized gatekeepers ￿ teachers,
book and journal editors, movie
producers, department chairs, art
dealers, and curators ￿ compete to
develop new products and talents. Every
success invites entry into the next
round, and the right gatekeepers of
today may not be the ￿hot hands￿ of
tomorrow as markets, meanings, and
tastes evolve. Under decentralization,
the audience ￿ whether scientific peers
or customers ￿ rather than the
individual gatekeeper becomes far more
important to the evolution of the
industry in question.
For example, before 1948, the
major Hollywood film studios had
achieved substantial market power for
their products by vertical integration:
The studios owned a large proportion of
U.S. movie theaters. This enabled the
studios to jointly control production and
distribution and made new entry into
film-making by independent producers
a daunting task. Not only did the
studios control their own theaters, but
independent movie theaters often either
had no access to the most popular films
or were required to book multiple titles
in advance without the power to review
the titles, a practice known as blind
booking.  After these practices were
declared illegal in 1948, the quality of
films, as measured by their audience
popularity, critical reviews, and awards,
became much more important in
determining studios’ profitability and the
success of their management.
In his 1982 article, Boyan
Jovanovic developed a theory to model
industrial performance under a ￿nobody
knows￿ condition, in which firms
discover whether they are ￿talented￿ by
All R&D: Basic and Applied
Research, and Development
Year Federal  Industrial Other
53-59 59.6% 38.1% 2.3%
60-69 63.9% 33.6% 2.5%
70-79 52.9% 43.6% 3.6%
80-89 45.7% 50.5% 3.8%
90-99 34.2% 60.6% 5.2%
2000 26.3% 68.4% 5.3%
TABLE 1
Sources of Support for All Types
of R&D by Source of Funds
Source: National Science Foundation, Science
and Engineering Indicators, 2002.
￿Other￿ includes universities and colleges,
state and local finance of university and
college research, and other nonprofit
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facing the market test. We can think of
talented firms as including literally
talented entrepreneurs and also firms
with intellectual property that provides
them with a sustained advantage in
innovative activity. In this model,
talented firms grow bigger and make
more profits. Industry productivity and
profits increase over time as some firms
learn that they are untalented and exit,
and new entrants, some of them very
talented ones that will survive, take
their place.
In his book, Michael Porter
argues that having free entry and rivalry
keeps companies on their toes, encour-
ages innovation and efficiency, and
discourages political favoritism. The
United States, by being home to Intel,
Texas Instruments, IBM, Hewlett
Packard, Motorola, and AMD ￿ all
producers of microprocessors ￿ has
obtained a sustained advantage in the
computer industry because it has this
kind of rivalrous industry.
Why does rivalry work so well?
In part, because rivals give each firm a
yardstick for performance. Excuses ￿
whether made to a superior, to the
government, to shareholders, or to
oneself ￿ just don’t play as well when
the competitor across the street or across
town is doing better. Moreover, the
visibility of the competitors’ practices
stimulates both emulation and one-
upping ￿ spillovers of information.  And
since new ideas by new entrants may be
offered to a variety of bidders, outsiders
are encouraged to add fresh talent to
the mix. Overall, using a variety of
industries and countries, Porter convinc-
ingly illustrates that nations that have
such rivalrous industries obtain lasting
national advantage over other countries.
On the negative side, rivalry
often seems to incite deep personal
antagonism.
How Rivalry Drives Innova-
tion. In a series of papers, Philippe
Aghion and co-authors developed a
formal theory that supports the value of
rivalry in innovation. The authors
describe industries that have step-by-
step innovations and differentiated
products, with one company sometimes
breaking out of the pack with a new
innovation. We can think of an
innovation as being a new generation of
a product line, such as a new generation
of video game players, a new type of car
like the minivan, or a new class of drugs.
Because products are differentiated and
some customers have strong preferences,
one company’s innovation does not drive
its competitors from the market
immediately, but the innovator’s profits
rise dramatically. The possibility of this
dramatic rise in profits spurs innovation.
Consider two rivals, which we
will call Inventor Bell and Tinker Bell,
who are in the business of supplying
custom cell-phone chimes.  They share
the market for 16-bit chimes but are
racing to develop 32-bit chimes. Each
knows that the first firm to come up
with 32-bit chimes will win 80 percent of
the market, which is sure to expand
because 32-bit chimes will enable
phones to play the ￿Star Wars￿ theme
song.  There are thus two effects: the
market expands and the innovator gets
a larger share.
Now suppose Inventor Bell is
the first to invent and market the 32-bit
chimes. Since Tinker Bell is able to
examine Inventor Bell’s product, Tinker
Bell’s cost of imitating are lower than
Inventor Bell’s cost of finding the next
innovation.6  If Tinker Bell can succeed
in imitating the innovation before
Inventor Bell moves on to, say, 64-bit
chimes, its profits will rise substantially
and Inventor Bell’s profits will drop
sharply.  Therefore, Tinker Bell has a
strong incentive to get back in the race.
But if Inventor Bell moves on before
Tinker Bell can imitate, it knows that
Tinker Bell’s incentive to innovate may
drop sharply, as it will need two rounds
of success to catch up.  This might leave
Inventor Bell with a clear field and a
long period of very high profits.  Thus,
Inventor Bell has a very strong incentive
to continue to innovate.
As long as there remain in the
industry some competitors who haven’t
fallen very far behind, the incentives  to
innovate for all of the competing firms,
both leaders and followers, will be high,
as long as imitation isn’t too easy. If
imitation is too easy ￿ if it’s much
cheaper to imitate than to innovate ￿
the incentive to innovate will be muted
because the leader retains its profits for
too short a period to justify the expense
of innovation.
Put another way, if Tinker Bell
can imitate Inventor Bell’s invention for
one-tenth of the cost Inventor Bell paid
to discover the invention, and vice
versa, each will prefer the other to be
the first innovator.  Then it is possible
that neither will invest in innovation.
The result will be an industry that is
competitive precisely because there has
been no innovation or progress. In this
model, innovation and competition will
have an inverted-U relationship: The
most innovative industries will be those
with some competition, not those with




One factor underlying the
relative performance of centralized and
rivalrous methods of innovation is how
knowledge evolves.  A key question is:
To what extent does knowledge evolve
6 When the original innovation is patented,
the follower has to find a way to imitate the
product without violating the original patent.
Edwin Mansfield, Mark Schwartz, and
Samuel Wagner found that a majority of the
sample of patented inventions they studied
were successfully imitated within four years
and that, on average, the cost of imitation
was a third less than the cost of the original
invention.26   Q1  2003 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
along foreseeable paths rather than
result from old views being replaced by
new ones?
If Scientific Advance Is
Foreseeable. One way of looking at the
evolution of knowledge is that knowl-
edge is mainly cumulative. If this is true,
the world should become more certain.
The more we know, the more sure we
will be in our knowledge.  If our views
are built on bedrock, that is, if funda-
mental theories are correct, new
evidence will only confirm them.  In this
case, new truths do not displace old
ones. Past knowledge is a reliable guide
to future knowledge.  Similarly, our
concepts of what is beautiful ￿ what
constitutes a good painting or good
music ￿ are not subject to radical
reconstruction.
In this type of world, senior
experts are friends of progress.  The
theories that the senior experts have
learned and taught are citadels.  The
most valuable new research in this
situation extends the reach of existing
theory into new areas and applications.
This type of scientific advance en-
hances the value of existing knowledge,
rather than conflicting with it.  In a
world like this, peer review committees
function well, since senior scientists
don’t disagree too much.
Since knowledge is cumula-
tive, older scientists tend to know more
than younger scientists. Seniority is a
good reason to pay someone more or to
allow someone more decision-making
authority.
But If Science Advances by
Revolutions. Another possibility is that
as knowledge advances, what we know
often becomes obsolete.  When new
ideas threaten to make old ones
obsolete, the incumbent experts may
attempt to block the development of
new ideas.  As the pace of gathering
knowledge accelerates, anomalies that
contradict existing theories are likely to
accumulate faster; so the advance of
knowledge more often requires making
old theories obsolete.
A more subtle effect of this
kind can occur when new inventions
make old methods obsolete and thereby
render old knowledge less useful.  For
example, the hand-held calculator
rendered the slide rule and the ability to
manually calculate square roots less
useful.  A senior scientist’s or engineer’s
knowledge base can become outmoded
in this fashion, even though it is not
contradicted. Similarly, the advent of
photography supplanted the purely
documentary function of painting in
favor of innovative and imaginative
aspects.
The development of the
telescope led Galileo to discoveries that
deepened questions about the Aristote-
lian-Ptolemaic theory of the universe.
The ability to measure the speed of light
overturned the Newtonian universe.
The ability to decipher genetic code will
change our understanding of biology
and evolution and, perhaps, may change
what it is to be human.
Who knew that jazz would be
the seminal form of American music in
the 20th century?  Not the musicologists
of the time. But the invention of the
phonograph, which captured the
excitement of improvised music and
made it available to the multitudes,
made jazz a worldwide musical influ-
ence almost overnight.
Universities and Academic
Stars.   One of America’s strengths in
innovation is a diverse collection of
private and public universities that have
substantial freedom to hire academic
innovators.  A recurrent question is:
How should universities use appoint-
ments and tenure decisions to attract
and support the best scholarship?
From the perspective of the
individual university, the question is:
How does a great university stay at the
top?  One way is to offer professorships to
academics who have published path-
breaking research and have already
achieved universal acclaim.
The alternative is to attract
innovators when they are doing their
best work ￿ hiring them when they are
doing the work that will win them their
Nobel prizes, rather than after they win.
This option is clearly riskier, since the
innovator’s work may not prove to be the
best. The university may get stuck with
the losers, particularly if other universi-
ties poach its stars. But if innovation is
proceeding fast enough, hiring professors
who are past their prime may gain the
university a reputation for standing in
the way of progress, rather than
representing the best.
On the other hand, it may well
be that great scholars or artists will be
founts of creativity for a long time. For
example, when Joseph Schumpeter
came to the Economics Department at
Harvard in 1932 at age 49, he still hadn’t
written three of the four works for
which he is best known.7
The development of the telescope led Galileo
to discoveries that deepened questions
about the Aristotelian-Ptolemaic theory of
the universe.
7 Those works are Business Cycles (1939),
Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (1942),
and History of Economic Analysis (published
posthumously in 1954).  The Theory of
Economic Development was first published in
German in 1911.   Business Review  Q1  2003   27 www.phil.frb.org
A diversity of universities, each
possessing its own methods for rewarding
teachers for producing knowledge and
for teaching, is an immense asset for any
economy.  Within this system of higher
learning, competition ￿ and decisions
on how to compete ￿ will play a
powerful role in determining the overall




The ￿low level of productivity
of Eastern Europe relative to that in
Western Europe,￿ as Stephen Nickell
writes, is ￿an impressive example of what
can be achieved by repressing the forces
of market competition.￿ It was not just
that the centralized economies of the
Soviet bloc were inefficient; they also
progressively fell behind at innovating
and in adopting innovation.
In basic research, where
findings may be too far from direct
application to be profitable, the federal
government remains predominant with
a 49 percent share, although its share
has declined (Table 2). But the grant-
making of federal science support may
not be able to adequately diversify its
research base: How do we decide
whether a research idea that goes
against the mainstream might be
successful anyway?  Typically, peer
review panels will not support such long
shots.  When this happens, private
foundations and for-profit corporations
can valuably supplement government
support.
Craig Venter￿s  ￿shotgun￿
approach to genomic research was
derided by members of the federally
funded Human Genome Project.9
Indeed, earlier he had proposed to use
the technique to decode the genome of
a bacterium, only to have his grant
request rejected.  He appealed the
rejection; meanwhile he used private
funding to proceed with his research on
the bacterium. The NIH review
committee rejected his appeal on the
grounds that it was unfeasible. A few
months after the rejection, he published
his transcription of the bacterial genome
in the prestigious journal Science.  He
then went on to use this method in the
draft decoding of the human genome,
again with private funding, substantially
accelerating that landmark event.
As described earlier, IBM was
one of the most successful innovators of
the 1950s and 1960s. In the late 1960s,
alarmed by the rapid advances in
technology made possible by miniaturiz-
ing integrated circuits, IBM embarked
on a project aimed at greatly increasing
the usefulness of computers called FS
(for Future System).  As Emerson Pugh
recounts in his history of IBM, although
a number of technological break-
throughs occurred, IBM never came
close to a marketable product and
settled for a modest extension of the 360
series, which it called the 370 series.
After this failure, IBM became
much more risk averse, and it became
more difficult for innovative projects to
advance cost effectively through the
IBM project management process.
Consequently, as described in Paul
Carroll’s book, IBM was slow to enter the
personal computing market.  After a few
in-house failures, IBM was forced to
turn to outside sources ￿ Intel for the
microprocessor and Microsoft for the
operating system.  Although the IBM
PC thus produced was an instant
success, IBM lost control of the PC
market and both Microsoft and Intel
profited more in the long run.
The French Academy of
Beaux Arts supported students and
artists. The identification of Paris with
painting continued well into the 20th
century. During the 19th century, art
students from around the world,
including Americans like Thomas
Eakins, came to Paris to learn how to
paint in the grand style.  Yet painting
was in the midst of an upheaval,
beginning with Impressionism, which
was foreign to the tastes of the reigning
French painters of the academy and the
official salons. As Annie Cohen-Solal’s
book shows, the new painting came to
prominence despite the opposition of the
state-supported institutions of painting.
Private art dealers, aristocratic patronage
outside the academy, a network of
independent teaching artists, and artists’
colonies both in Paris and in the
provinces were all important sources of
support for the new painting.
These examples point out not
that government or large businesses
8 This issue made headlines at Harvard
University when new President Larry
Summers vetoed two appointments to the
Harvard faculty, as described in the Wall
Street Journal article by Daniel Golden.
9 See the magazine article by Richard
Preston.
Basic Research
Year Federal  Industrial Other
53-59 57.1% 32.2% 10.8%
60-69 68.7% 19.2% 12.1%
70-79 70.0% 14.5% 15.5%
80-89 64.6% 19.4% 16.0%
90-99 55.3% 26.3% 18.4%
2000 48.7% 33.9% 17.5%
TABLE 2
Sources of Support for Basic
Research by Source of Funds
Source: National Science Foundation, Science
and Engineering Indicators, 2002.
￿Other￿ includes universities and colleges,
state and local finance of university and
college research, and other nonprofit
organizations.28   Q1  2003 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
cannot successfully support research or
creativity but that a proliferation of
sources of support can be crucial to rapid





Studies. A vast empirical literature
investigating the relationship between
competitiveness and innovation, most of
it produced between 1965 and 1995,
argued that there was little systematic
relationship between competitiveness
and innovation.  Work by F. Michael
Scherer showed that ￿there was little
evidence of disproportionately great
R&D input or output associated with
the largest corporations, and market
concentration showed no significant
positive impact on progressiveness.￿
Studies summarized in Wesley Cohen
and Richard Levin￿s article echo this
theme.
More recent studies, which
were based on detailed and systematic
data on innovations by industry in the
United Kingdom, have argued that
industry innovation declines as industry
concentration rises.  Richard Blundell,
Rachel Griffith, and John Van Reenen
found that while dominant firms tend to
innovate more than other firms, this
dominance dampens innovative activity
for other firms in the same industry. On
net, they found empirically that the
dampening effect on the smaller firms
outweighed the innovative activity of
the dominant firm.
Stephen Nickell showed that
industries that are more competitive
have faster rates of innovation as
measured by the rate of increase of total
factor productivity (TFP).10 TFP
measures the growth of industry output
that can’t be accounted for by the
growth of labor, capital, or materials
alone.  This is a very good measure of
overall growth of innovation, since
innovations are the main explanatory
factor omitted from the measured
inputs.
In 2002, a study by Philippe
Aghion and co-authors garnered a
result that is perhaps closer in spirit to
Schumpeter’s original argument. They
found an inverted U-shape relationship
between patenting activity and
competitiveness: Very competitive
industries have low patenting activity as
do industries that are very profitable.11
This is Schumpeterian in that too much
competitiveness appears to be detrimen-
tal to innovation, since the rewards to
innovation vanish too quickly to repay
it.  At the same time, the study found
that monopolization of an industry
results in too little innovation, perhaps
for the reasons suggested by Michael
Porter. Overall, these results conform to
their model of step-by-step innovation.
CONCLUSION
Is our era one of incremental
knowledge or of innovation?  To the
extent that it is an age of innovation,
decentralized and competitive struc-
tures ￿ whether capitalist or govern-
ment supported, profit or nonprofit ￿
will favor economic growth.
Can a centralized system
decentralize?  Ultimately, this is an
empirical question. In principle, a
monopoly can operate like a decentral-
ized system.  That is, a monopolist may
be able to use internal competition ￿
between managers or divisions ￿ to
obtain results similar to those obtained
through market competition.
But the monopoly has its own
incentives that may not align with
progress. New products may reduce
profits on existing products when the
new products are successful and waste
them when they are not. Moreover, new
products may require changes in
corporate focus that make production of
existing profitable products less efficient.
Clearly the existence of rivalry
￿ competing institutions that encour-
age innovation ￿ is very valuable in
generating innovation. Yet we should be
mindful that even where competition
has free rein, progress may be unneces-
sarily slow. Excessive competition may
arise where imitation is too easy.
Moreover, the return to innovative
activity may be too distant from the
innovation to provide adequate private
incentives to create.
Thus, innovation may best be
served when there are a wide variety of
sources of support: large and small firms,
small foundations and big government
agencies, new-firm incubators, and
venture capitalists.
10 Nickell’s survey asked managers whether
the company had more than five competitors
in the market for its products. He used this as
one measure of competitiveness. Another
measure of competitiveness is profit margin,
which is the amount a firm can charge for its
products above costs, where costs include
labor and capital. In general, competition
should drive profit margins close to zero, so
that large profit margins imply lack of
competition. Nickell defined profit margins as
profits less capital costs, divided by value
added.
11 Like Nickell, Aghion and co-authors use
profit margins as an inverse measure of
competitiveness.  They define profit margins
as operating profits divided by sales. Their
analysis uses a series of changes in industrial
regulation in Britain to identify the role of
competitive conditions in influencing gains in
industrial productivity.
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